Transnistria - The last ‘Cold War’ of the EU

In the midst of constant tensions in the East of Europe, Transnistrian officials continue to reinforce their identity as an “integral part of Russia”. This silent, but constant threat has been pressuring the Eastern geopolitical scene; but what role does it have in the current context?

Historical Overview

Three decades ago, the political map of Europe started seeing some of its most notable changes due to the fall of the Soviet Bloc. Half of the continent redefined its borders, but not with ease - one relic of the years-long race to self-determination still lies untouched between Moldova and Ukraine. The Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic currently represents a strip of land that was recently classified by the Council of Europe as militarily occupied by Russia, although self-proclaimed as independent.

Steffen Wurzel, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Historically, the first independence movements in Transnistria occurred following the establishment of the Popular Front of Moldova (PFM), in the late 1980’s. The infamous ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ policies brought regional autonomy in the USSR to a new level, and the aforementioned PFM started voicing outrage against the Cyrillic alphabet and Russian speakers, with some extreme factions even suggesting they should not be part of the region. After gaining independence from the Soviet Union, the desire to not split from the ‘motherland’ was visible along the Dniester, not only socially, but also politically as a revolutionary movement. Not long after, the Transnistria War of 1992 erupted, leading to the recently-independent Republic of Moldova losing de facto control of the area. Negotiations ensued, as Russia pressed for a federalised Moldova, which eventually was entirely denied by Chișinău. This proposal would have enabled the regional government in Tiraspol (Transnistria’s declared capital city) to veto the decisions taken by executive bodies. The ground for rejecting such a plan was mostly based upon the effective stripping of Moldovan people’s sovereignty, creating two parallel systems of values and governance.

TUBS, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

European tendencies and the question of Ukraine

At a time in which Ukrainian national sovereignty is under attack and Moldova’s pro-European administration is strengthening its ties to EU institutions, dissent grows between involved parties. The breakaway region has silently challenged Moldova’s interests ever since gaining independence, acting as a beacon of pro-Russian and Soviet nostalgic feelings. Moscow claimed in 2022 that Russian voices are actively being discriminated against, sparking direct diplomatic conflict with the government of Moldova. Later the same year, Moldovan and Ukrainian intelligence supposedly discovered an elaborate Russian plan to overthrow the Western-oriented coalition led by Maia Sandu through inciting protests and civil outrage. Once discovered, mass police mobilisation was enacted in order to prevent any and all separatist movements or rallies, as such, the central authorities were left untouched.

Retaliation came shortly after, as the Moldovan Parliament and Government, led by the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) ruled in favour of criminalising all separatist action, increasing military spending and, later, expelling Russian diplomats. The European Peace Facility decided to extend the allocated funds for the respective armed forces’ modernisation efforts. Despite this general mobilisation in favour of the Chișinău administration, the economic power of Transnistria currently lies mostly in the European Union. Its exports to the EU amount to the majority of all exported goods. As of now, few sanctions are imposed on Transnistria, being limited to freezing of a set of peoples’ assets and travel restrictions, half of the measures having expired at the end of October 2023.

It is becoming apparent that this relatively small area around the Dniester River is not only driven by a nationalist sentiment but accelerated by Russia’s ambition to hold onto strategically positioned outposts, on the European Union’s easternmost points. All of the military bases are essential thanks to the pressure they exert on Ukraine in the West. Maintaining this frontier under permanent suspicion by Kyiv might be one of the greatest advantages employed by Russia in their operation. The Kremlin authorities on the other hand claim to seek the best for their people, as Transnistria is still a predominantly Russian-speaking region, attempting to formally ban the latin script and the use of Romanian / Moldovan language on its territory.

Pridnestrovian editor, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

With inexistent international recognition, aside from three other separatist administrations, Transnistria might not seem like an active threat. But for its neighbours, it represents an impediment to Moldova’s European aspirations and an additional factor of instability in the Ukrainian conflict. Tensions continue to grow as certain arrests of opposition leaders in Transnistria are protested against, and Moscow spreads rumours of a “Nagorno-Karabakh” solution being proposed by the European Union and Romania. Diplomats on their side directly implied that there would be an active threat of a western invasion. Although there is no evidence to support this claim yet, Ukraine directly proposed an armed attack on the region, at the time when Russia was reinforcing their bases here (i.e. before launching the invasion of Ukraine).

Future horizons

Maia Sandu, the Moldovan president and leading figure of PAS is now looking at a scenario similar to Cyprus’ accession to the EU: not accounting for the separatist provinces. It is now Brussels’ turn to review the feasibility of the proposal and, therefore, set a milestone for diplomatic efforts here.

At this moment, the challenge has become one of how the two populations will continue to coexist, if they are able to, as the discrepancies between their interests become increasingly apparent.

References

Râncioagă, L.Ș, (2012). Recent Evolutions of the Political Climate in Transnistria. 1(35), 381-392. https://cis01.ucv.ro/revistadestiintepolitice/files/revistadestiintepolitice35.pdf#page=381

Bob, D., & Wouter, Z. (2022, September). Walking the tightrope towards the EU. Clingendael Institute. https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2022/walking-the-tightrope-towards-the-eu/

Gavin, G. (2023, September 19). Don't let Putin keep us out of the EU, Moldova implores. Politico.eu. https://www.politico.eu/article/nicu-popescu-moldova-foreign-minister-european-union-accession-membership-putin-russia/

Mihai, C. (2023, July 6). EU integration process key to solving Transnistria conflict, Moldovan official. EURACTIV.com. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/eu-integration-process-key-to-solving-transnistria-conflict-moldovan-official/

Killing of opposition leader in Moldova's breakaway Transnistria region is under investigation. (2023, July 17). AP News. https://apnews.com/article/moldova-transnistria-opposition-leader-killed-dc34ebd076835215ecdf422dca667035

Bulos, N., (2023, May 1). Far from Russia, a pro-Moscow sliver of land tries to cling to its identity — and keep war at bay. Latimes.com. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-05-01/transnistria-pro-russia-keep-out-ukraine-war