During the summer of 2023, two coups engaged the international political realm and initiated a season of military occupation in West and Central Africa. Circumstances caused by economic struggle and political discontent have resulted in military juntas taking control of governmental institutions.
What we have witnessed this summer in Gabon and Niger is not a deja-vu. There must be a specific reason why the western and central African countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea. Mali, Niger and Sudan are known as “Coup Belt”. Since 2020, this region has experienced eight coups, with the latest two occurring this summer in Niger and Gabon. The persistent situation of governmental instability and corruption opens the doors to military leaders who seek power through undemocratic means.
The recent events in Gabon have shown a group of military officers declaring null the elections that had just confirmed the third reelection since 2009 of President Ali Bongo Ondimba, who has been in power for 14 years. The election, held on 26 August 2023, was conducted in a climate of widespread distrust by the population and the independent media. Any foreign delegation of international observers was prohibited from entering the country, foreign journalists were denied accreditation and internet access was blocked immediately after the end of the vote with an imposed curfew. Moreover, the reception of French TV RFI, France 24, and TV5 Monde, widely watched in Gabon, has been suspended by the Bongo’s government on the grounds of "lack of objectivity and balance in their coverage of the ongoing elections”.
Within minutes of President Bongo's election announcement, a military junta had announced the Coup d’état on Gabon 24, a national TV channel. Brice Oligui Nguema was nominated by the junta as a transitional president, while Ali Bongo is under house arrest. The first act of the military junta was the restoration of internet connections and foreign television programs and the dissolution of governmental institutions, heavily influenced by the former president. During the interview with Le Monde Brice Oligui Nguema cited public discontent with Bongo's governance as the reason behind the coup.
To understand how Gabon's political situation led to a coup, we must consider the historical context. Taking a step back, the ongoing unrest can be attributed to the decades-long dominance of power by the Bongo family since Gabon's independence from France in 1960. The current Ali Bongo is not the first one in his family to govern Gabon for many decades, his father Omar Bongo, was president four times and after his death, in 2009, Ali Bongo was elected, establishing the ruling dynasty of Bongos in Gabon presidential office and political affairs for more than 50 years.
The general discontent is related to many decades of mismanagement and the continued economic struggles the population faces. Recent economic challenges, including the impact of COVID-19 and the Ukraine conflict, have exacerbated inflation and its heavy toll on food prices, contributing to the volatile situation we witness today. Although Gabon is the leading country in continental Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of per capita GDP, it's an optical illusion: 30% of the population lives below the poverty line, and 40% of the youth are unemployed.
However, the drop that broke the camel's back was the absence of transparency and fairness in the election, which saw Bongo as President with more than 64% of the votes.
The waves of military occupation in the West and Central African countries do not end with the military junta controlling the Republic of Gabon. It was considered a relatively stable country and, during the coup, was not involved in outbreaks of violence. The involvement of international forces seems different to what other countries like Niger have faced.
Two years ago, Mohamed Bazoumthe became the first democratically and peacefully elected president in Niger since the independence of 1960 from France. However, on the 26th of July 2023, the country's presidential guard removed him from office, motivating the action to prevent further deteriorating economic and security problems. The newly formed military junta closed the borders and appointed General Abdourahmane “Omar” Tchiani, the commander of the presidential guards, as the head of the country’s new military government.
Analysing the international response, two blocks could be identified: the supporters of the coup and the supporters of President Mohamed Bazoumthe. The first ones are the countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana and Russia together supported by the Wagner Group, whose role in helping the success of coups is confirmed through a video in which mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin appeared to hail the military coup and offered his fighters’ services to bring order. Conversely, "Western" nations, along with the European Union, ECOWAS, the African Union, and the UN, are actively backing the restoration of President Bazoum, who was democratically elected. The European Union, for instance, has ceased its financial support to Niger, and the French foreign ministry has suspended its entire development aid budget, totalling 120 million euros in 2022. They have made it clear that their support hinges on the swift return to constitutional order, with President Bazoum at the helm.
A slightly different role is played by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which on July 30th threatened to use force against Niger if the military junta failed to restore the democratically elected President, combining the intimidation with heavy financial sanction among the 15 members. While the borders were reopened and the European and American citizens and embassy evacuated from Niger to neighbouring countries, the ECOWAS sent a delegation to negotiate with the military government. Nevertheless, the pro-coup demonstrations not only persisted but also intensified during the commemoration of the 63rd anniversary of independence from France on August 3rd, as protesters gathered in front of the French embassy in the capital, Niamey, waving Russian flags.
The decision of the one-week-old military government to sever ties with the French, European and Western influence in the country is obvious with the revocation of five military accords with France and the suspension of the broadcast of French state-funded international outlets. In the meantime, the threats conducted by the ECOWAS held steady and the coup leaders took the step of closing the country's airspace. Despite efforts from the AU, US Deputy Secretary of State, and ECOWAS delegations, every action was met with denial and rejection. Within the country, Rhissa Ag Boula and the Council of Resistance for the Republic (CRR) initiated internal resistance against the military rule, leading to Niger's military pursuing charges against Bazoum for "high treason and undermining the internal and external security."
An accord was stipulated on the 19th of August. After the meeting between General Abdourahmane “Omar” Tchian and the delegations of ECOWAS Tchiani proposed a three-year transition of power, warning that any military action against Niger would be dangerous for any other party. Although on national television he did not ensure an already-decided plan, a 30-day window of dialogues was conducted by the ruling military council to settle the next steps.
It is possible to highlight numerous causes for the outbreak of Gabon and Niger coups, which can be regrouped into three major trigger factors: economic struggles, political instability and the presence of foreign forces. Both countries have deep connections with the old continent and they are violently marked by the colonial past and ties with France. The refusal of European action in the countries is evident in both circumstances and the emancipation from foreign influence is applauded by the population.
In Gabon’s case, the dynasty of Bongos was a close ally of the French governments from Charles De Gaulle to Jacques Chirac, allowing extensive French military presence inside the borders and the control of oil. The extraction was partially entrusted by Elf Gabon, a subsidiary of Elf Aquitaine a French oil company, which had extensive business dealings with Bongo's regime. It also allowed a military staging point for the French-sponsored military in Gabon, which was used in actions throughout Africa.
Now, it is possible to witness the celebration and manifestation of content in the Gabonese population after the putschists put "an end to the current regime". However, as opposed to what happened in Niger on the 26th of July, neither military cooperation nor development aid has been cut off by Paris and the invitation to restore the constitutional order does not imply the restoration of the former president, based on the idea of transparency and fair elections supported by the Elysée.
In this sense, the opposite response seems to have involved International politics in Niger, where the same contagious sense of relief seems to have infected the streets and squares. After two months of face-to-face confrontation with the ruling military in Niamey, the French President was forced to announce the withdrawal of his soldiers and the recall of his ambassador, signing a turning point for the influence of France in the Sahel region. The military junta did not collaborate with international and regional forces denouncing French and Western "neo-colonialism" and their interference in Nigerien affairs. The tensions did not end nowadays, taking into consideration the climate in neighbourhood countries that have declared their alliance with Niger military government, like Mali and Burkina Faso, where French military presence was prohibited earlier this year.
It is impossible not to ask if this general political unrest in the region is the ultimate and final emancipation of former French colonies from their former colonizer, marking the end of "Françafrique".
References
Ajala, O. (2023, July 31). What caused the coup in Niger? An expert outlines three driving factors. The Conversation. Retrieved September 28, 2023, from https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721
Carletti, F., Blasioli, S., Magnani, A., & Netti, E. (2023, August 30). Colpo di Stato in Gabon, spodestata dopo oltre 50 anni la dinastia dei Bongo. Il presidente ai domiciliari. Il Sole 24 ORE. Retrieved September 28, 2023, from https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/colpo-stato-gabon-spodestata-oltre-50-anni-dinastia-bongo-presidente-domiciliari-AFPEO4g
Finlator, W. (2023, September 5). How France lost control of Gabon. UnHerd. Retrieved September 28, 2023, from https://unherd.com/2023/09/how-france-lost-control-of-gabon/
Gabon: France faces a new coup in its old African stomping grounds. (2023, August 31). Le Monde. Retrieved September 28, 2023, from https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/08/31/gabon-france-faces-a-new-coup-in-its-old-african-stomping-grounds_6117258_4.html
Gabon, Niger, and Other African Coups: What's Driving Them? (2023, September 3). Foreign Policy. Retrieved September 28, 2023, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/03/gabon-niger-sahel-africa-coups-military-us-france-policy/
Giardina, V., Cassandro, D., & Rizzo, G. (2016, October 13). In Gabon il potere passa da padre a figlio ma la Francia non ci sta più. Internazionale. Retrieved September 28, 2023, from https://www.internazionale.it/opinione/vincenzo-giardina/2016/10/13/gabon-ali-bongo-francia
Timeline: What has happened in Niger since the coup? | Politics. (2023, August 20). Al Jazeera. Retrieved September 28, 2023, from https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/8/20/timeline-what-has-happened-in-niger-since-the-coup
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